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1. Introduction:  Subject and Object 
Dimitri Ginev and I once worked together on a project entitled “Analytic vs. Hermeneutic 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Science”.1  In the course of our discussions, one topic 
often came to the fore.  Dimitri argued that the scientific realist position that I endorse is 
wedded to an untenable dualism of subject and object.  This dualism gives rise to a number of 
characteristic problems that disappear once the dualism is renounced.  In this paper, I return 
to the topic in order to consider what a scientific realist might say about the dichotomy of 
subject and object. 
 I will begin with some remarks about terminology.  As I understand the subject-object 
distinction, the contrast is between the knowing subject and the known object.  On the one 
hand, there is the subject who possesses knowledge.  On the other hand, there is the object 
that is known to the subject.  Though much is known to the subject about their own mental 
states, in the cases of interest the known object is in the “external world” outside the mind.  I 
do not restrict the knowing subject to humans, since I regard knowledge as a natural 
phenomenon.  At least some non-human animals possess knowledge.  I tend not to employ 
the traditional expression “external world”, since I think of the knowing subject as immersed 
in the world rather than separated off from it.  Nor do I think of knowledge as restricted to 
“objects” in any strict sense, since there may be knowledge not just of objects, but of 
                                                          
1 This was the title of a collaborative research project which brought Dimitri to the University 
of Melbourne as visiting scholar in 1997. 
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properties, relations, facts, events, regularities, laws of nature, etc.  I have a slight preference 
for the expression ‘epistemic agent’ rather than ‘subject’, since I think of knowers as active 
participants rather than passive subjects.  My realism has a pragmatist orientation, since I take 
realism to be grounded in practical interaction with the objects in our immediate 
surroundings.2 
 The notion of an object is connected with the notions of objectivity and of an 
objective world.  As a realist, I hold that we inhabit an objective reality that in large part 
exists independently of thought, language and conceptualization.  Against the sceptic, I hold 
that we are able to have genuine objective knowledge of this mind-independent reality.  But 
this epistemologically optimistic view brings with it a number of characteristic problems, 
most importantly, that of explaining how knowledge of such a mind-independent reality is 
possible.  How are we able to bridge the epistemic gap between the subjective realm of belief 
and the objective extra-mental world?  This is the place where Dimitri’s concern about the 
subject-object dichotomy gets its grip.  The suite of epistemological and metaphysical 
problems that must be addressed by the realist simply disappears if one denies that there is an 
epistemic gap between mind and world because there is no subject-object distinction to open 
up the gap. 
 In what follows, I will first characterize the scientific realist position that I adopt.  I 
will then address the question of the nature of scientific knowledge from a realist point of 
view.  Next I will consider the question of how to locate the knowing subject within the 
                                                          
2  Though my pragmatist orientation starts at the ground level of practical interaction with 
everyday objects, it extends to the theoretical knowledge found in the sciences.  Although I 
do not follow Hacking in his restriction of scientific realism to entity realism, I am persuaded 
by his talk of intervention that we must take seriously scientists’ practical interaction with the 
world in the context of experimental science (Hacking 1983).  I also hold that a pragmatist 
orientation is of relevance to meta-methodological considerations about the warrant of the 
rules of scientific method (cf. Rescher 1977). 
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context of scientific realism.  After that I will consider the place of mind in an objective 
world.  I will close with some general remarks on the topic. 
 
2. Scientific Realism and Common Sense 
As classically understood, scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is truth.  
Given that the aim of science is truth, scientific progress must consist in progress toward that 
aim.  Because science is successful, we may be confident that science has made considerable 
progress toward the aim of truth.  The aim of truth need not be thought of in terms of one true 
and complete theory of the world toward which science advances.3  Instead, the aim may be 
to build up an increasing store of truths of a singular as well as a general nature that are 
known about the world.  With the advance of science, considerably more truth is known now 
than was known previously.  Rather than convergence on one true theory, progress might 
better be thought of as continued increase in the amount of truth that is known about the 
world.4 
 For the realist, truth must be a correspondence relation between what we believe 
about the world and the way the world is.  Truth cannot be an epistemic notion, such as 
                                                          
3  I find the idea of “one true and complete theory” of the world next to incomprehensible.  
Would such a theory contain a complete enumeration of all of the facts throughout the 
entirety of space and time?  It is difficult to imagine a theory of that kind, let alone conceive 
of one.  Hacking raises doubts not only about such a theory but about the idea of a complete 
description of anything (Hacking 1983, p. 94).  I discuss the issue in somewhat greater detail 
in my (2008, pp. 261-2). 
 
4  Unfortunately, my way of thinking about progress in terms of increase in truth falls foul of 
the same problem that confronted Popper’s notion of verisimilitude, viz., any addition of new 
truth will be accompanied by new falsehoods.  While I recognize that there may be formal 
difficulties which confront the notion of an increase of truth, I am optimistic that a technically 
adequate account of the notion will be developed.  For present purposes, I remain content 
with the intuitive idea that we now know a great deal more truths about the world than we did 
at an earlier stage in the history of science. 
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coherence or ideal justification, since that would lead to an idealist metaphysics (cf. 
Musgrave 1997).  Because realism stands opposed to idealism, the realist requires a notion of 
truth that is non-epistemic.  Truth does not depend upon what we believe, or on what we are 
justified in believing.  The truth of claims about the world depends upon the way that the 
world in fact is.  The idea that truth is a correspondence relation captures the idea that the 
truth of a claim about the world depends upon the world in fact being the way that the claim 
says that the world is.  Of course, more needs to be said about the exact nature of 
correspondence.  For my part, I favour a construal of correspondence in terms of causal 
relations of reference along the lines once proposed by Hartry Field (1972).  But it is entirely 
possible that a more minimalist construal of the correspondence theory of truth is compatible 
with realism.  What is essential is that the notion be a non-epistemic one. 
 According to the scientific realist, scientific investigation is not restricted to 
observable features of the world.  It extends to aspects of the world that are not open to direct 
inspection by our unaided senses.  As scientists seek to explain observed phenomena, they 
develop scientific theories.  In the process, they often postulate the existence of unobservable 
theoretical entities whose behaviour gives rise to phenomena at the observable level.  
Evidence for theoretical entities is typically indirect, involving explanatory considerations as 
well as confirmation of the observational consequences of the theory that posits the entities.  
Discourse about theoretical entities is not to be reduced to discourse about observable 
entities.  Scientific talk about theoretical entities is to be taken literally as discourse which 
genuinely refers, or purports to refer, to unobservable entities that actually exist in the 
objective world.  A theoretical term (e.g. ‘phlogiston’, ‘aether’) may fail to refer if the entity 
to which it purports to refer does not in fact exist.  Nor is the reference of a theoretical term 
tied uniquely to the theory in which the term is introduced.  It is possible for the same term to 
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be employed by different theories to refer to the same thing.  Indeed, different theories may 
refer to the same theoretical entity even if they do not employ the same term. 
 I have always understood scientific realism in what I take to be the classical sense as 
committed to the idea that the aim of science is truth.  However, I have been persuaded by 
Stathis Psillos that it may not be necessary to take a thesis about the aim of science as an 
essential ingredient of scientific realism.5  The aims of science may vary historically, and 
from one science or group of scientists to another.  Instead of arguing that all of the 
potentially competing aims of science must somehow be subservient to the overriding aim of 
truth, the realist may instead adopt an epistemological approach.  On this view, the realist 
need not be committed to the thesis that truth is the one paramount aim subserved by all other 
scientific aims.  Instead, we may think of scientific realism as primarily an epistemological 
thesis.  According to this epistemological thesis, science not only can but routinely does 
produce genuine knowledge of the objective world which it investigates.  The advantage of 
adopting this epistemological construal of scientific realism is that it retains a robust 
commitment to scientific knowledge while avoiding the need to defend the view that all 
scientific aims must subserve the paramount aim of truth, or that all scientific activity 
ultimately serves a single aim. 
 The standard argument for scientific realism is the “no miracles” argument that 
realism is the only way to explain the success of science without appeal to a miracle.  This 
argument is usually thought of as an inference to the best (or perhaps the only) explanation of 
the success of science.  I have myself employed a version of this argument at the meta-
                                                          
5  I am grateful to Stathis Psillos and the members of his seminar for discussion of this issue 
and other topics relating to scientific realism while I was a visitor at the University of Athens.  
Psillos’s statement of scientific realism involves metaphysical, semantic and epistemic 
components, with no mention of the aim of truth (see Psillos 1999, p. xix).  I had always 
found this puzzling.  But I now recognize that a robust form of scientific realism may be 
articulated without reference to the aim of science. 
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methodological level to argue for a realist theory of scientific method on which the rules of 
method are to be conceived as reliable means to arrive at truth (e.g. Sankey 2000).  But there 
is one reason why I prefer not to overemphasize the “no miracles” argument.  It seems to me 
that the attempt to establish realism by this route overlooks the extent to which science is 
grounded in the practical activity of scientists, who as agents interact with the world around 
them.6  This issue brings me to the topic of common sense and its relation to science. 
 Some philosophers hold that there is a conflict between science and common sense.  
Some also hold that where there is a conflict between science and common sense, it is 
common sense that must give way to science.  On this view, common sense is outmoded 
theory, which is to be rejected with the advance of scientific inquiry.  If the view that science 
leads to the overthrow of common sense is combined with a scientific realist outlook, we 
arrive at the view that what science tells us about the world is correct and the commonsense 
view is to be rejected as false.  Hence, some scientific realists adopt an eliminativist view of 
common sense on which our ordinary commonsense descriptions of the world are to be 
rejected in favour of the descriptions provided by our best scientific theories. 
 But this is to throw the baby out with the bath water.  In my view, we are to be realists 
about the ordinary everyday objects with which we interact on a daily basis.7  Though we are 
                                                          
6  In drawing attention to the importance of scientists’ practical interaction with the world for 
realism, I follow Hacking.  I have argued elsewhere that Hacking’s experimental argument 
for realism is in fact an inference to the best explanation of the success of scientific practice 
(Sankey 2012).  Thus, contrary to Hacking, the argument is not fundamentally different in 
form from the standard argument for scientific realism.  Despite this, I think that Hacking is 
right to emphasize the importance of actual scientific practice in the case for scientific 
realism. 
 
7  Some realists may argue for the existence of ordinary things by means of an inference to 
the best explanation of experience.  This may have made sense in the context of a sense data 
version of indirect realism (cf. Russell 1959, pp. 22-3).  But I think that the warrant for belief 
in such things is more direct than this.  We directly perceive objects and their properties.  
Such direct perception provides the belief in such objects and properties with their warrant. 
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prone to error and may be subject to illusion, much of what we ordinarily take ourselves to 
know of the world immediately around us is true.  As I write these words, my computer is 
indeed on the desk before me, the window is open and there is a tree outside in the courtyard.  
To deny these things would be to reject the dictates of common sense in favour of a 
scepticism about the external world for which no compelling reason may be provided.  Rather 
than eliminate common sense, we should take common sense as our “epistemic base” in the 
words of David Armstrong (2004).  What Armstrong calls the “Moorean truths” of common 
sense are not to be rejected.  They are to be taken as our epistemic starting-point. 
 On the view that I propose, science is to be viewed as an outgrowth of common sense.  
The rules of scientific method are in many cases a more rigorous application of procedures 
employed as part of our ordinary everyday epistemic interaction with the world.  Most 
importantly, observation by means of our senses plays a crucial epistemic role in both 
common sense and science.  It is true that beliefs that have formed part of common sense are 
on some occasions rejected.  But what more generally occurs is that phenomena known to 
common sense are explained by science.  In such cases, science does not reject common 
sense.  It provides us with an explanation of phenomena of which we have experience in our 
commonsense interaction with the world around us.8  
The point is important for the epistemology of scientific realism.  If we are able to 
take much of commonsense belief to be well-grounded, then less emphasis may be placed on 
the “no miracles” argument.  To the extent that science is an outgrowth of common sense, the 
epistemic credentials of science derive from its basis in common sense rather than from a 
tenuous abductive argument that the success of science is best explained by realism.  I have 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
8 I distinguish between widely held beliefs and basic common sense.  Beliefs widely held in a 
culture may come and go.  But the beliefs of basic common sense (e.g. beliefs about our 
immediate surroundings based on sense experience) are far more resistant to change.  I 
discuss the relation between science and basic common sense at greater length in my (2014). 
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no doubt that such reasoning plays a role in ordinary common sense.  But it seems to me that 
practical interaction with the world in experimental settings provides stronger vindication of 
claims about theoretical entities than recourse to the “no miracles” argument suggests.  I am 
strongly inclined to the view that sense perception and embodied action bring scientists into 
causal contact with theoretical entities with which they interact in experimental settings.9  
The point is greatly reinforced if one takes into account the pervasive use of instrumentation 
in laboratory settings to extend perception and to control and manipulate entities not 
detectable by the naked eye. 
 
3. Is Scientific Knowledge Justified True Belief? 
The title of this section intentionally follows the title of Edmund Gettier’s famous paper 
(1963).  However, I will not pose or attempt to solve scientific versions of Gettier’s problem.  
My question is instead whether the idea that knowledge is justified true belief may serve as 
an appropriate suggestion about the nature of scientific knowledge. 
 As traditionally understood, knowledge may be analysed in the following terms: 
S knows that P if and only if: 
(1) S believes that P 
(2) S is justified in believing that P 
                                                          
9 Here I must issue a promissory note.  I wish to combine a direct realist theory of perception 
with a scientific realist account of theoretical entities.  In perception, we causally interact 
with observable entities.  The observable entities are made up out of unobservable theoretical 
entities.  Given the perceptual interaction with observable entities, we thereby causally 
interact with the theoretical entities of which they are made.  Perception therefore causally 
connects the observer with unobservable entities that make up observable entities.  I 
recognize that more must be said to justify the move from perception of observables to causal 
interaction with unobservables.  But this is the direction in which I think that scientific 
realism might usefully be developed in order to better ground it in scientific practice. 
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(3) ‘P’ is true 
This is the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, against which Gettier 
presented two counter-examples.  It is not without interest in the present context that the 
analysis refers to S.  Though ‘S’ might stand for Smith or perhaps someone, I take it that ‘S’ 
is meant to refer to a subject who holds the belief that P.  But it is not entirely clear that such 
an analysis of knowledge or indeed reference to a subject is appropriate for scientific 
knowledge. 
 In the first place, we sometimes speak of scientific knowledge where we do not mean 
to refer to specific belief-states of individual human knowers.  We may use the expression 
‘knowledge’ to refer to a body of knowledge rather than to specific states of knowing.  We 
might, for example, speak of the knowledge found in a specific field of science.  Or we might 
wish to refer to the entire corpus of scientific belief.  When we use the expression ‘scientific 
knowledge’, we might be using the word ‘knowledge’ in the strict sense of justified true 
belief, so that individual scientific beliefs must be both justified and true in order to count as 
knowledge.  But it would not be an inappropriate use of the expression ‘scientific knowledge’ 
to use it in such a way that it refers not just to those scientific beliefs that are true and 
justified, but in addition to scientific beliefs that are well-grounded though not true.  Indeed, 
scientific knowledge might be taken to include outmoded theories which are no longer 
accepted but continue to have some applicability in restricted domains.  Thus, the expression 
‘scientific knowledge’ may be employed to refer to beliefs that are justified but in fact false, 
as well as to beliefs that are known to be false.  In short, there seems to be a usage of the 
expression ‘scientific knowledge’ that does not work with a strict understanding of 
knowledge as justified true belief. 
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 In the second place, there is a potential tension between the idea that knowledge is 
justified true belief and a scientific realist view of the truth-status of contemporary science.  
Few if any scientific realists take themselves to be committed to the truth of all claims that 
may be found within current science.  Rather, scientific realists typically take the view that 
our best scientific theories are to be accepted as true or approximately true.  It is crucial for 
realists to allow that theories may be approximately true, since realists need not hold that the 
end of science is near.  Though some particularly well-established scientific claims may be 
true, much of contemporary science may later be revised or profoundly altered.  For this 
reason, scientific realists tend to see science as advancing toward the truth, so that our best 
contemporary theories are to varying degrees approximations of the truth rather than true 
simpliciter.  But if a theory should be taken to be approximately true, rather than true, it is 
hard to see how belief in the theory might constitute knowledge in the sense of justified true 
belief.  After all, the traditional analysis of knowledge does not say that ‘P’ is approximately 
true. 
 There may perhaps be some way to reconcile the justified true belief analysis of 
knowledge with the idea that our best current theories are to be accepted as approximately 
true.10  But I would tend to approach the matter in another way.  Given that many 
contemporary theoretical claims about the world may only be approximately true, they are 
strictly speaking false.  Hence, such claims do not constitute items of scientific knowledge.  
However, they may well be grounded in the rules of scientific method in a way that provides 
them with a sound epistemic justification.  Such claims will therefore constitute justified 
                                                          
10 One way may be to say that approximately true claims should be understood as 
approximations that are in fact true.  For example, the claim that I am exactly six feet tall is 
false, though it is approximately true that I am six feet tall.  We should understand the latter 
as the claim that I am approximately six feet tall.  That approximate claim is true. 
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beliefs for the scientists who hold them on an appropriate basis.  Thus a significant proportion 
of the current corpus of scientific belief may constitute justified belief rather than knowledge. 
 However, this is entirely consistent with saying that some, perhaps even a significant 
proportion, of the current corpus of scientific belief does constitute knowledge in the sense of 
justified true belief.  All that is required is that appropriately justified beliefs are in fact true.   
If such scientific beliefs are true, given that they are justified, they constitute knowledge.  So 
the corpus of contemporary scientific belief may contain not only justified beliefs, but also a 
significant body of knowledge in the strict sense of justified true belief.   
 Of course, one may ask:  “How does one know that one has scientific knowledge?”  
In the case of any particular purported item of scientific knowledge, how does one know that 
that item constitutes an item of knowledge rather than mere justified belief? 
 Part of the answer to this question is that in very many cases one does know that one 
knows.  If we reject scepticism, we hold that knowledge is possible.  There will be cases in 
which our epistemic justification is of the sort that, given that we reject scepticism outright, it 
is clear that we do have knowledge.  I am thinking particularly of cases of immediate 
observation where we are able to inspect objects directly to determine their properties.  In 
such cases, the only temptation to say that we do not have knowledge is the temptation to 
concede to the sceptic that we do not have epistemic access to the external world.  But that is 
a temptation that we may justifiably resist. 
 In other cases, we may know without knowing that we know.  Here, I am thinking of 
those cases where we may not have a high level of confidence in a theoretical claim about 
unobservable states of affairs because it fails to have strong evidence in its favour.  In such 
cases, if the theoretical claim is in fact true, and if our justification for the claim is well-
grounded in the norms of scientific method, then we have knowledge.  We may not be 
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confident of our knowledge.  In a sense, therefore, we may fail to know that we possess the 
item of knowledge.  But we do not need to know that we know in order to have knowledge.  
It suffices that the conditions for knowledge stated by the justified true belief analysis of 
knowledge be satisfied.  There is no need to know that the conditions are satisfied, though in 
some cases we may know this.11 
 
4. The Subject in Scientific Realism 
What, then, are we to say of the subject-object distinction for scientific realism?  As we have 
seen, the realist is committed to the existence of a mind-independent reality that objectively 
exists “outside the mind”.  If the realist wishes to endorse the view that scientific knowledge 
may be justified true belief, it appears to follow that the realist is committed to the existence 
of a knowing subject.  With the exception of knowledge of our own mental states, therefore, 
knowledge requires a knowing subject and a known object outside the mind.  Thus, it appears 
that the realist must adopt the dichotomy of subject and object that Dimitri sought to 
challenge.  Is this such a bad thing? 
                                                          
11 In saying that we may know that we know, the possibility of a regress arises.  If we know 
that we know, where knowledge is understood as justified true belief, the question arises of 
the status of this second-order item of knowledge.  Presumably, it too must be a justified true 
belief.  But if the second-order item of knowledge is a justified true belief, how is the item of 
second-order knowledge justified?  Presumably, appeal must be made to a third-order item of 
knowledge, namely, that we know that we know that we know.  In this way, the assumption 
that we may know that we know leads to an infinite regress.  To avoid the regress, I suggest 
we follow Roderick Chisholm in adopting a stance of epistemic particularism.  The question 
of what we know is prior to the question of how we know.  We identify particular items of 
knowledge independently of the question of what criteria these items of knowledge must 
satisfy in order to be knowledge.  If the process of justifying an item of belief gives rise to a 
regress, this does not impugn the status of the item of knowledge.  Of course, this may beg 
the question against the sceptic.  But, as Chisholm admits, this may be unavoidable (see 
Chisholm 1973, p. 37). 
 
13 
 
 Here it is important that realism be placed in the context of epistemological 
naturalism rather than within the context of a traditional Cartesian epistemology.  In the 
Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes employs the method of hyperbolic doubt to 
identify the basis of epistemic certainty.12  On the basis of reflection upon what it is possible 
to doubt, Descartes came to the view that one thing that can be known for certain is that the 
doubting subject, a thinking thing, exists.  An evil demon might create a massive illusion in 
which everything we believe is false.  No things, bodies or general properties exist.  It is not 
just that the senses deceive us.  We have no senses.  Reflection on the possibility of such an 
illusion may lead us to doubt everything that we believe.  We thus find ourselves in a 
situation in which we doubt everything.  But, if we doubt, then we exist.  For we must exist in 
order to doubt.  Having recognized that inability to doubt his own existence was something 
that he clearly and distinctly perceived to be the case, Descartes took clear and distinct 
perception to be a criterion of epistemic certainty.  But he did not take clear and distinct 
perception of external objects to guarantee the existence of external objects.  To guarantee the 
veridicality of beliefs about external objects, Descartes appealed to a non-deceiving God.  
This led him into the infamous Cartesian circle.  He employs clear and distinct ideas to argue 
for the existence of God.  He then appeals to God to guarantee the veracity of clear and 
distinct ideas. 
 In the case of Descartes, the distinction between subject and object is the source of a 
profound epistemological challenge that cannot be met.  It is impossible to start with mental 
states known directly to the mind of the knowing subject, and then to mount a compelling 
                                                          
12 Apart from naturalistic misgivings about scepticism, I find the method of hyperbolic doubt 
to be a highly dubious method indeed.  It assumes that doubt may be generated “for free”.  It 
assumes that we may choose to doubt without specific reason for doubt.  For discussion of 
the dubious nature of Cartesian doubt, see Rescher’s discussion of doubt based on sensory 
error in Descartes (Rescher 1982).  
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case for the existence of an external world based solely on intrinsic features of these mental 
states available to the knowing subject by reflection or introspection.  Thus, the subject-
object dichotomy lies at the heart of Cartesian epistemology and the traditional problem of 
scepticism about the external world. 
 But, if we reject Cartesian epistemology in favour of a naturalistic epistemology, the 
situation is altered.  Instead of the internal mental states of the knowing subject, we should 
start with the basic commonsense claims (the “Moorean truths”) about the world around us 
that Armstrong calls the epistemic base.  We reject scepticism about the external world in 
favour of genuine knowledge of the ordinary everyday things that surround us.  The standards 
of epistemic justification and knowledge are the standards of common sense and science, 
rather than the standard of introspective epistemic certainty bequeathed to us by the Cartesian 
sceptic.  If we approach the question of knowledge on the basis of such a non-Cartesian 
naturalistic approach, then the subject-object dichotomy is less of a threat.  We are not 
confronted with the impossible task of rebuilding the external world on the basis of mental 
states to which we have direct epistemic access.  We are instead grounded in the world 
immediately around us to which we have epistemic access by way of our senses.  There is no 
great gulf between mind and world because we are in the world and we interact with it. 
 This, by the way, is why we should discard the phrase ‘external world’.  It is an 
expression that reflects the Cartesian predicament in which we seek to show that the world 
outside of our minds fits with the contents of our minds.  The expression ‘external world’ 
goes hand-in-hand with the Cartesian sceptical dichotomy of subject and object, and should 
be rejected as we reject the Cartesian basis for that dichotomy.  But this is no reason to think 
that we must renounce the dichotomy of knowing subject and known object.  Provided only 
that the subject is a living embodied agent practically engaged with the objects in their 
immediate vicinity, no threat is posed by the dichotomy of subject and object. 
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5. Mind in an Objective World 
As we have seen, the realist holds that we inhabit a mind-independent, objective world.  It is 
this world of which science provides theoretical knowledge.  The idea of mind-independence 
gives rise to a further aspect of the subject-object dichotomy, which also arose in 
conversation with Dimitri.  What is the place of the human (or any other) mind in this mind-
independent reality?  If the world is mind-independent, does this mean that there are no 
minds?  Is there any place for the knowing subject in an objective reality? 
 Few modern-day scientific realists would have much sympathy for Cartesian 
dualism.13  The idea of mind as a categorically distinct substance unable to causally interact 
with physical substance has little currency in the modern scientific world-view.  Minds are a 
naturally occurring part of a thoroughly physical world.  Hence, scientific realists may be 
materialists or physicalists who deny that there is any sui generis mental stuff.  Contemporary 
philosophical discussion of the mind-body problem explores such questions as whether 
mental states reduce to, supervene upon, or are to be eliminated in favour of brain states. 
Still, there is a sense in which the scientific realist should not be committed qua 
scientific realist to a physicalist outlook.  If our best scientific theory were to propose that 
mind consists of mental substance entirely distinct from physical substance, then the realist 
should endorse this view.  The non-material mind might be thought of as a theoretical entity 
whose existence was postulated to explain certain phenomena.  Though we may now think 
                                                          
13 Here a brief terminological note is in order.  I take Cartesian dualism to be a position in the 
philosophy of mind according to which mind and matter are distinct substances.  This 
metaphysical view is distinct from the epistemological distinction between (knowing) subject 
and (known) object.  At least some of the time, Dimitri seems to use the expression 
“Cartesian dualism” to apply to both positions (e.g. forthcoming).  But I suggest that the 
positions are distinct, and neither stand nor fall together.  
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that there is no such entity, substance dualism may well have been an appropriate position for 
the scientific realist to adopt at the time of Descartes. 
Despite this, there is a sense in which the question of the relation between mind and 
matter is not the point at issue with respect to mind-independence.  The crucial question 
relates to the ontological status of things outside the mind, such as mountains and rocks, 
tables and chairs.  The question is whether such things exist in their own right, independently 
of mental activity, or depend for their existence on mental activity.  Such things as rocks and 
mountains do not depend for their existence upon any mental states that we might have.  
Naturally occurring things such as mountains and rocks existed before humans ever formed 
beliefs or concepts relating to them.  They continue to exist whether or not we think that they 
do.  Artefacts such as tables and chairs are built by humans and so depend for their existence 
qua tables or chairs upon human intention and activity.  But their existence qua physical 
objects does not depend upon human thought, experience or conceptual activity. 
 One might still wonder about minds.  Surely minds cannot exist in a way that is 
independent of the mental.  It makes no sense to say that minds are independent of mind.  If 
anything is mind-dependent, the mind surely is.  Or is it? 
 Here it seems to me that the correct response may be somewhat counter-intuitive.  
Trivially, no mind may exist without itself.  Still, in the relevant sense of mind-independence, 
minds do in fact enjoy a mind-independent mode of existence.  I do not need to believe that I 
have a mind in order to have one.  Nor do I need to possess the concept of a mind in order to 
possess a mind.  A young human child may have a mind before developing sufficient mental 
capacity to be able to recognize that they have a mind.  Similarly, non-human animals may 
have a mind or be capable of having mental states though they may never be able to acquire 
the conceptual apparatus required for them to know that they have a mind. 
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 An individual who possesses a mind need not recognize that they do.  Nor must their 
possession of a mind be recognized by anyone else.  The fact that one has a mind does not 
depend on the recognition that they have a mind by someone else.  If an individual possesses 
a mind, this is an objective fact about them that does not depend on anyone thinking or saying 
that they have a mind.  Their having a mind is, in the relevant sense, a mind-independent fact 
about them. 
 Given this, I do not think that the subject-object dichotomy is undermined by the 
realist commitment to the existence of a mind-independent reality.  The realist is primarily 
concerned to insist that the world that exists beyond the human mind does not depend in any 
way for its existence on the mind or mental activity.  But the mind has a place within this 
reality as a naturally occurring possession of certain kinds of organisms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The scientific realism that I favour is a scientific realism that is grounded in our immediate 
interaction with the world.  Rather than place undue weight on an inference to best 
explanation of the success of science, I emphasize practical aspects of scientists’ interaction 
with the world.  But this is not some narrow empiricism of the present moment, since the 
evidence available to our senses is the basis on which we build the scientific world-picture.  
Science may be an outgrowth of common sense.  But it has taken us a tremendous distance 
beyond that which is immediately accessible to us in experience. 
 The dichotomy of subject and object does not loom large in contemporary discussions 
of scientific realism.  There are no doubt interesting explanations for this which turn on the 
fact that scientific realism tends to be pursued within the tradition of analytic philosophy.  
Still, it seems clear that the scientific realist can engage with the issue.  In particular, there 
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seems to be no need for the scientific realist to abandon the dichotomy of subject and object.  
Nor does the dichotomy pose a challenge for the scientific realist.  Provided that the realist 
abandons the project of traditional Cartesian epistemology in favour of a naturalistic 
approach to epistemology, subject and object may be retained within a thoroughly realistic 
outlook on the world. 
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